SECOND BATTLE

OF THE

MARNE

The 1st Division suffered 7,000 casualties, of whom it is believed that not one was a prisoner. Sixty per cent of it's infantry officers were killed or wounded, in the 16th and 18th Infantry all field officers were casualties except the colonels, were casualties. Notwithstanding it's losses, the 1st Division, by constant attacks throughout four days and nights, had broken through the entrenchment's in the German pivot to a depth of 11 kilometers, had captured 68 field guns and quantities of other material, in addition to 3,500 prisoners taken from the seven separate German divisions which had been thrown against the 1st United States Division in the enemy's desperate effort to hold ground which was essential to his retaining the Marne salient.

Never again could friend or enemy question the fighting qualities of the American soldier!

But while the work of the 1st and 2nd Divisions attracted most attention because of the special importance of their attack, they were not the only American divisions to participate in the July 18th offensive. [A little south of the 2nd Division, units 4th Division had been separated and were in line with French divisions. They joined in the attack and continued to advance until July 22nd. The 4th Division was subsequently re-assembled as a division and would relieve the 42nd Division in the salient on August 2nd.] The 26th Division was just northwest of Chateau-Thierry and together with the 167th French Division formed the 1st American Corps, which was the first American corps to exercise tactical command. This corps acted as a pivot in the beginning and later had to advance under peculiarly difficult conditions. For the 26th Division maneuver was much complicated in order that the front of the division might conform to the general plan; not only was it necessary for the division to pivot during attack, but at one time, the right half of the division had to attack simultaneously in two directions.

Notwithstanding the difficult nature of it's task, and the fact that it lost 5,300 officers and soldiers, the 26th remained in the attack until July25th; some of the elements having been continuously fighting for eight days and nights. The division had advanced more than 17 kilometers against determined enemy resistance, had taken the villages of Torcy, Belleau, Givry, Epieds, and Trugny, and had captured large quantities of enemy material. On July 25-26 the 26th Division was relieved by the 42nd Division, which, after having taken some part in the successful resistance to the German attack of July 15th in Champagne, had been brought round to the Chateau-Thierry region.

Just east of Chateau-Thierry and south of the Marne the 3rd Division had broken up all efforts made against it on July 15th. Now on July 20th the 3rd Division received orders to join the counterattack. By skillful work of the command and staff the division had gotten well across the Marne by the 22nd and without having encountered serious resistance. From the 22nd to 25th the division was engaged in bitter fighting in wooded slopes leading up to the village of le Charmel, which was taken on the evening of July 25th. Constantly fighting it's way forward, the division took Roncheres, and finally on July 30th was relieved by the 32nd Division [which had just been transported into the sector from Belfort]after having suffered a total loss, in the defense of the Marne and in crushing the German resistance , of about 7,900. (

The 28th Division also had elements with French and American divisions during the attack and won great credit. As has been mentioned, the 42nd Division relieved the 26th on July 25th. On the next day the 42nd Division attacked, and by the 28th it had crossed the Ourcq and taken Sergy. Here the enemy offered desperate resistance, launching counterattack after counterattack, the village of Sergy changing hands four times. But the 42nd definitely occupied Sergy on the morning of July 29th and continued to press forward until August 2nd when the enemy withdrew.

[In late] July three American divisions, the 3rd, 28th and 42nd were in line there, side by side with [another], the 4th, in close support [and the 26th and 32nd preparing to deploy]...By August the Germans had taken up a position behind the Vesle and Aisne Rivers, where they held fast...On 5 August the entire front of the French Sixth Army was held by two American Corps...

The 4th Division now relieved the 42nd, and on August 6th ... the battle front stabilized on the line of the Vesle (our 4th and 32nd Divisions being in line). The 42nd had lost some 5,500 officers and men.

...Now eight American divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 32nd, and 42nd) had been indispensable in the reduction of the Marne salient. We had lost over 30,000, but the results were commensurate--not only was the Marne salient [greatly] reduced, but the initiative had been gained by the Allies and was never to be lost--the value of the American soldier, which had first been demonstrated by the 1st and 2nd Divisions, had been verified by the conduct of six other divisions.

From the beginning the Commander-in-Chief had never varied from his determination to bring the American forces together. The German offensive, however, had interrupted the execution of this plan, forcing us to utilize all our efforts to the end that the war might not be lost. Now, however, the initiative had passed into the Allied hands and there appeared to be no good reason for longer delay. On the contrary, the Chateau-Thierry operations had involved such difficulties in the way of supply and the evacuation of sick and wounded (in all of which we were largely dependent upon the action of French staffs) that it was apparent that our troops must be assembled. A few divisions might be properly cared for when dispersed under foreign command, but our forces had increased to the point where it became imperative to begin assembling them. [Preparations began for the American led St. Mihiel Offensive and the AEF Divisions started shifting from the Marne to the Verdun sector. More action, however, was to follow in the Marne region.]

TWO FUTURE MARINE COMMANDANTS CAPTURE THE SPIRIT OF THE CORPS AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE IN A LEGENDARY BATTLEFIELD MESSAGE:

For a month, from the first week in August to early September, the Germans stalled the French and Americans on the Vesle lines. The Americans held roughly six kilometers from St. Thibaut to Fismes and bitterly fought the Germans in seesaw actions for the possession of bridge heads at Bazoches, Chateau du Diable, and Fismette...Afterwards Bullard commented: " I have rarely, if ever, seen troops under more trying conditions... they were on the spot and they stayed there..." Any movement by day brought down fire, as the Germans used cannon to snipe at careless soldiers. They were also lavish with mustard gas... Throughout most of the month in "Death Valley," a name the Pennsylvanians [28th Div.] gave the Vesle Front, the 28th Division under portly Charles H. Muir shared the sector with the 77th Division [made up] of draftees from New York City and its suburbs...

What finally broke the deadlock on the Vesle was an attack by the French Tenth Army north of Soissons in late August. Although understrength and not yet recovered from the rigors of their fighting on the Ourcq and Vesle lines, the 32nd Division took part in this operation. In fact their capture of Juvigny on August 30th was a crucial blow against the German Defenders.

The French used the nickname "Les Terribles" to praise this division's prowess in battle... Their battles of late July and early August had been hard, but the Juvigny fight was much tougher. The German Defenders fought hard and made effective use of the caves in the are to protect their machine guns but "Les Terribles" were stubborn in their determination to force the Germans back. They succeeded in capturing the ruins of the village of Juvigny and in advancing some two and a half miles in five days of constant battle. The division historian referred to this period as "five days of hell on earth."

...The Germans gave up the Vesle line only to fall back a few kilometers nearer the Aisne River where they again stabilized the front. They could be proud of their defensive actions since the collapse of their last offensive. The attack at Soissons had surprised them, but, after a couple of anxious days the German commanders had regained control of the situation. True, they had to give up the Marne salient, but they succeeded in withdrawing their forces to pre-planned phase lines on the Ourcq and the Vesle on schedule... Significantly, [however,] the German definition of success changed in July from how many kilometers they advanced to how well they conducted a retreat.

The results of the Aisne-Marne operation were far out of proportion to its size...the initiative [on the Western Front] had passed to Allied hands, where it would remain, and Ludendorff would be compelled to postpone indefinitely his cherished Flanders offensive. With German morale sagging, it was clear that Ludendorff's hope of crushing the Allies before the United States could put a large force in the filed would not be realized.

Even as the Second Battle of the Marne was winding down the AEF had begun its first major offensive as an independent force at St. Mihiel.