Latin America in World War I
By Ron Genini
MIDI Background: Heitor Villa Lobos, Brazilian Cycle: Prelude No. 1 in Em (19k) Sequenced by Reinhard Czwiertnia. Waiting on permission from ø The Classical MIDI Connection.
In their four general conferences prior to World War I (1889, 1901, 1906
and 1910) the American republics had not considered the need or advantage
of collaboration to preserve their neutrality in the event of a foreign
war, or to defend themselves against possible aggression. So, the outbreak
of war in 1914 found them without any plan of action. Consequently,
whatever measures of cooperation were undertaken had to be on a completely
ad hoc basis.
The one instance of effective cooperation during the neutral phase (August
1914-April 1917) of the war was the meeting of the financial ministers in
Washington in May-1915. This meeting, the First Pan American Financial
Conference, was initiated by Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo, who had
noted the economic and financial dislocations in Latin American countries
brought about by the rupture of their European connections. McAdoo saw an
opportunity for the United States to supply the needs of the southern
republics and, as he said, "to develop the spirit, at least, of continental
solidarity." The acts of the conference covered the categories of
commerce, finance, and transportation. This conference was historic in
that it marked the transition of Latin America's financial and economic
dependence from Europe to the United States.
Aside from this conference, the record of Pan-American cooperation during
the neutral phase was disappointing. With a few exceptions noted below, the
Latin Americans saw the conflict as none of their business and saw little
or no threat of any kind. For its part, the Wilson administration was late
in recognizing the dangerous potentialities inherent in a world conflict
and was thus without sufficient foresight to recommend some kind of
defensive agreement.
When World War I began, the republics of Latin America as well as the United
States hoped to stay out of it and to leave Canada as the only American
nation involved on either side. In Aug-1914 most of those nations cut
off international cable messages in either code or cipher and declared
their neutrality. Wars disrupt trade and regular international financial
transactions and this was the case for several of these countries - Brazil
lost a British loan opportunity, Chilean industries were hard hit and
unemployment rose, Bolivia had to borrow from an American bank to ride out
the rupture of trade and all of Central America experienced trade losses.
As time went on these nations began to benefit from the war. It is macabre
but true that great wars in distant places can be good for business and
these nations had resources which were now in demand by the belligerents.
Though all had declared their neutrality both sides claimed bias and both
interfered with that neutrality. By the Hague Convention warships were
permitted to anchor for 24 hours or risk seizure. In 1914 as the German
Pacific squadron sailed near South America, Britain and France protested
that Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile were assisting the German fleet by
allowing naval ships to take on coal, use their wireless in territorial
waters or overstay their 24 hour limits. The Allies asked the United
States to use its influence to force neutral behavior and Secretary of
State Bryan reported that the nations in question were indeed neutral and
the Allies accepted that.
German ships were seized in Argentina and Chile, in the latter case the
seizure was for the duration. The Germans and the Allies violated neutral
rights - Panama complained that British and Japanese colliers were
violating neutrality, Britain imposed the hated Black List which prohibited
any trade by any company that was doing business with Germany or funded by
Germans. In other words a company in Brazil would have its goods seized at
sea if they were being sent to Germany or if the company was
German-controlled. Germany complained that Argentina was being unneutral
by allowing British steamers to carry Argentine horses to France, Britain
complained that Cuba and Chile were being unneutral by allowing German
ships to provision in Havana and Valparaiso, and Germany complained that
President Wilson had closed the Panama Canal to belligerents in the
interests of the Allies.
There were unfounded rumors that Chile's Easter Island and Ecuador's
Galapagos Islands harbored German bases and that these were used to attack
Allied shipping. In fact, Japanese and British warships moved freely about
the Galapagos hunting for Von Spee's squadron. But the greatest British
violation - attacking the German cruiser Dresden where it took refuge in
Chilean waters at Juan Fernandez Island - was nothing compared to the
German U-boat attacks on cargo and passenger ships. Such attacks would lead
one republic into the war, put pressure on another to enter and, when it
pushed the United States into the war inspired ten other countries to
declare war or break diplomatic relations with Germany.
Regarding the Dresden, Von Spee, after raiding Tahiti, headed east toward
South America, where he hoped to be joined by the Leipzig from North
America and the Dresden from the South Atlantic. British Admiral Craddock
had pursued the Dresden from the West Indies but was ordered to stay at
the Falkland Islands and await reinforcements. Hearing that the Dresden
was off Chile, he surmised that South America was Von Spee's destination.
Craddock then took his ships around the Horn to look for Von Spee, who had
arrived at Valparaiso and was cruising the coast. Neither admiral was
aware of their proximity until they met and engaged in the battle of
Coronel (1-Nov-1914), in which two British ships were sunk and the
rest escaped back to the Falklands. Von Spee then went south to San
Quintin Bay, about 300 miles north of Magellan Straits. British
consternation at the defeat led to a wide commission for Admiral Sturdee to
seek out and destroy Von Spee. When Von Spee rounded the Horn the two met
in the battle of the Falkland Islands and only the Dresden escaped;
hunted and helpless it was discovered by the Glasgow and the Kent at
Juan Fernandez and sunk on 14-Mar-1915.
While none of the Latin American nations moved against Germany until after
the United States had declared war, American neutrality wasn't always
admired. Brazil's Ruy Barbosa had founded the Brazilian League for the
Allies in 1915. This group engaged in propaganda and fund-raising. For
Barbosa and his followers the U.S. neutrality policy after the sinking of
the Lusitania became an object of contempt. He attempted to show how
despicable was the position of a powerful country that was suffering all
manner of insults and yet would not align itself on the side of right,
honor and justice.
The many Europeans in South America, as well as Japanese on its west coast,
were enthusiastic for their homelands at war. British, French and Japanese
enclaves were clamoring for their adopted countries' support of the Allies,
as were Italians after Italy entered the war, while German communities were
just as enthusiastic for Kaiser and Fatherland. Many British and German
immigrants returned in 1914 to fight for their homelands - especially from
Argentina and Brazil.
The four major nations in Latin America were Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Mexico.
After the United States declared war on Germany, Mexican President
Venustiano Carranza declared that Mexico would maintain "strict and
rigorous neutrality" in a statement with critical reference to its northern
recent antagonist. This attitude was unfortunate for Mexican influence in
the United States, for the suspicion was widespread that German money was
backing Carranza and that he was a tool of German interests. The Zimmerman
note tended to confirm this suspicion. It became known in the United
States that several Mexican newspapers were subsidized by Germany and the
attitude of the populace was frequently sympathetic to the German
ambassador and antagonistic to the U.S. representatives. Carranza, having
been helped into office by American pressure, did not increase the prestige
of his country with the nation whose support he most needed.
The oil situation in Mexico might have made foreign intervention a
certainty during the war, as Britain depended on the Mexican oil supply for
her Navy. The oil wells near Tampico were in a territory controlled by the
bandit Pelaey, who was paid protection money by the oil companies. When
Carranza threatened to move against Pelaey, British oil men feared
destruction of the wells. Further trouble threatened in Carranza's talk of
an embargo on oil exports.
He had proposed a conference of neutrals that would seek to end the war by
mediation, but that if this failed they should impose an economic boycott
on all belligerents. Superficially this proposal seemed to be impartial,
but actually it would have operated in favor of Germany, who did not have
access to the food products and raw materials of Latin America because of
the Allied blockade. The Allies enjoyed this privilege as a belligerent
right; to deny it would have been a responsibility of neutrals under the
Hague Convention. Carranza's proposal found no takers.
In Jun-1918 a number of Mexican editors visited the United States and were
met by President Wilson. The President assured them that the U.S. had no
intention of intervening in Mexican internal affairs and that the Monroe
Doctrine, long seen by Latin Americans as a blank check for Yanqui
intervention, was meant to protect rather than exploit Latin America. This
was cooly received by Carranza who issued a statement that as long as the
Covenant of the League of Nations contained a recognition of the Monroe
Doctrine, Mexico would never sign it. Under another President, Mexico
eventually joined the League in 1922.
Carranza was not so much pro-German as he was an anti-U.S. Mexican
nationalist. Another was Argentina's President Hipolyto Irigoyen.
Irigoyen detested the Anglophile cattle barons and the Francophile
intellectuals and despised the many Argentines who looked to Italy as their
mother country. He saw no reason to have his country do anything but
profit from the sale of her war materials, which she was doing on an
enormous scale, without bothering about the balance of power or
international moral issues of questionable validity. German submarines and
poison gas did not strike him as particularly odious. Probably the
majority of the population supported him but there were great pressures on
him to join the Allies. To Irigoyen, the entrance of the United States into
the war was merely another good reason for Argentina to stay out.
When Wilson called on all remaining neutral states to follow the U.S.
example and break relations with Germany, the Argentine government excused
itself on the ground that it was distant from the scene of conflict.
Fearful of German reaction, Irigoyen felt it was prudent to refrain from
any public statement of sympathy for the U.S. cause "at so critical a
juncture."
German U-boats had sunk two Argentine ships and the reaction was mass
anti-German demonstrations in Buenos Aires. German Foreign Minister Alfred
Zimmerman realized that Germany's stock in the Americas was rapidly
declining, so he offered to apologize and to have the Argentine flag saluted.
When two more Argentine ships were sunk Argentina presented an ultimatum to
Berlin. The German response was slow and unsatisfactory: it would, if a
German investigation proved that the Germans were at fault, make
reparations. Germany then agreed to spare Argentine ships. The U.S.State
Department had intercepted letters between Zimmerman and German Minister
Karl von Luxburg which gave another side to the German position: it was
poor psychology, Luxburg wrote, to allow news of such maritime losses to be
circulated, therefore Argentine ships should either be left alone
altogether or else sunk without a trace, which involved gunning the
survivors in lifeboats. Luxburg went on to sneer at the Indianism of South
America, make disparaging remarks about Irigoyen and Foreign Minister
Honorio Puerrydon whom he characterized as "a notorious ass and
Anglophile." These coldblooded remarks as well as the insults aroused
public feeling and German-owned businesses and clubs were wrecked by angry
mobs. Luxburg was expelled and in Sep-1917 the Argentine Congress
voted 76-19 to sever relations with Germany. Irigoyen, however, was
amazingly patient and ignored the clamor of the "best people", continuing
diplomatic relations.
Immediately following the U.S. declaration of war, Irigoyen proposed a
conference to be attended by only the Spanish-American states. His plan
was to isolate the United States and possibly Brazil from the other
American republics and to assert a dominant influence over Latin American
affairs. Although most of the invited governments at first accepted the
invitation, their enthusiasm soon cooled when they realized how unwise it
was to exclude the United States. In the end only Mexico sent delegates,
who arrived in Buenos Aires to find that the congress had been postponed
indefinitely.
In Sep-1918 Argentina did agree to sell surplus wheat to Britain and
France. This was a popular move with the pro-Ally population and was a
solution to the problem of mounting surpluses. Perhaps Irigoyen's
unpopular neutrality paid off: Argentina emerged as a creditor nation for
the first time in its history.
After the war, when the League of Nations refused to include Germany and
snubbed Argentina in a question about membership on the Council, Irigoyen
withdrew his country from the world organization.
Chile's neutrality was not as unpopular as Argentina's. When Germany
announced unrestricted submarine warfare, Chile, which had become complacent
after the Dresden affair, realized the threat it posed to maritime
nations. There were a few pro-Ally demonstrations in the major cities but
the Chilean government merely warned Germany that if there was no attack,
relations would be preserved. On the other hand it's press promised "that
Chile will be as friendly to the United States as Brazil and Uruguay."
Leading Chileans regarded neutrality as "an essential step toward creating
a bloc of truly independent South American nations capable of standing up
to the United States in hemispheric relations." Without question Chilean
neutrality reflected to some degree a combination of anti-U.S. and
pro-German sentiment in the country.
If Chile had counted on a united South American front, she was sadly
mistaken. With the exception of Argentina, Chile was isolated. To make
matters worse, both Peru and Bolivia, seeking U.S. support for their
anti-Chilean revisionist territorial ambitions, quickly rallied to Wilson's
call for continental anti-submarine solidarity. It was this situation
which, as the war drew to a close, was responsible for a lot of
backtracking by Chile and belated efforts to curry favor with the United
States.
Chilean help to the Allies was the taking over of German-owned nitrate
plants. The plants were seized to defray the sequestering of Chilean
government funds in German banks.
The war had brought an unprecedented demand for Chilean nitrates and
copper. This had an effect similar to events in Europe. The masses, poverty
stricken and unemployed after the end of the war threw thousands out of
work in the nitrate fields, were attracted to Luis Recabarren, an admirer
of the Russian Revolution who had founded the Chilean Communist Party. The
reactionary government of President Juan Luis Sanfuentes was faced with
urban rioting and bloody strikes and, as 1919 drew to a close, a class
struggle seemed imminent.
The only large South American nation to declare war on Germany was Brazil.
German submarines had sunk neutral Brazilian ships. Some outrage had
broken out when the Rio Branco, named for one of Brazil's greatest
statesmen, was sunk in May-1916; the outrage died down when it was found
that no Brazilian lives were lost and the ship was of British registry.
When unrestricted submarine warfare was announced, Brazil warned that if
relations were to be maintained, Brazilian ships would have to be safe. On 5-Apr-1917
the Parana was sunk off the French coast and the submarine
fired into the stricken ship as it was sinking, killing three Brazilians.
In Rio de Janeiro angry crowds attacked German businesses and on 11-Apr-1917
President Wenceslau Braz expelled the German Minister, von Pauli. To this,
the press and public gave a hearty approval.
Brazil's position was anomalous until she finally entered the war. On 25-Apr-1917
she declared neutrality in the war between the United States and
Germany. This was highly displeasing to many Brazilians, especially Ruy
Barbosa and his League for the Allies. Barbosa advocated the ouster of
Foreign Minister Lauro Muller on the grounds that, being of German origin,
he was too complacent towards the Central Powers. A week later Muller was
fired and replaced by Nilo Pecanha who openly declared that his policy
would be pro-Ally. President Braz endorsed this policy with the statement
"Brazil should adopt the attitude that one of the belligerents forms an
integral part of the American continent, and that to this belligerent we
are bound by traditional friendship and by a similarity of political
opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America and the principles
accepted by international law."
Brazil was formally neutral but Braz's statement led to the pre-seizure
wrecking of some of the German ships in Brazilian harbors. Forty six ships
were seized (and repaired) because of the threat of submarine warfare to
Brazilian shipping. In Jun-1917 Brazil revoked its neutrality and U.S.
and other Allied warships guarded Brazilian merchantmen. By October four
Brazilian ships had been sunk and the captain of one taken prisoner.
On 26-Oct-1917 Brazil declared war, stating that Germany had forced the
war on the country. Church and press endorsed this and the following month
the Congress enacted the War Law. This was a seamy side to her
participation in the Allied crusade - German assets, mainly banks and
insurance companies, were seized as well as the 46 ships. The President
was also empowered to declare any area "under siege" - an important move
because of the Germans in southern Brazil.
These German settlers had never assimilated. Lutheran ministers from
Germany, rifle clubs, German schools, clannishness, newspapers and the dual
citizenship Germany allowed all seemed a threat. Never silent about making
the area part of a Pan-Germany, these settlers rarely regarded themselves
as Brazilians and still thrilled to the call of the Fatherland. Oppression
of these people was debatably harsh but the region was kept quiet.
Brazil wanted to send troops to fight the Turks in Mesopotamia where her
soldiers would be better prepared for "tropical" (hot) weather than the British, but
transport was the main obstacle. Some military and naval missions were
sent to Europe, a few of the missions took part in combat and were
decorated, and some airmen were sent to Italy for training. The Brazilian
Navy took over the watch in the South Atlantic, patrolling for German
submarines and sweeping mines laid off the coast of West Africa. Troops
were being prepared and if the war had gone into the next year there is no
doubt that actual fighting units would have been sent to Europe.
Brazil's greatest contribution to the Allies was food - especially beef,
beans and sugar. Another was the use of the seized German ships. Though
the declaration of war was little more than a gesture, it was not an
insignificant step in her rise to respectable status in world affairs and
also heightened the sense of nationalism in the huge, disjointed republic.
At the Paris Peace Conference Brazil played a dignified role under the
leadership of (later President) Epitacio de Silva Pessoa. Brazil's
concerns were twofold: who would pay for the German seizure of Brazilian
coffee in Germany and Belgium and what to do with the captured German
ships, which France wanted. The coffee matter was included in the Treaty
as one of Germany's debts and Brazil got the ships. When the United States
refused to join the League of Nations, Brazil eagerly presented herself as
the leading western hemisphere power in that organization and won a seat on
the Council.
The Central American and Caribbean republics were officially pro-Ally. Of
course Panama and Cuba were treaty protectorates, and Haiti, the Dominican
Republic and Nicaragua were de facto protectorates - so their declarations
of war or severing of relations with Germany were less than fully free
will.
The Cuban Congress endorsed the request by President Mario Menocal to join
with the United States in pursuing international justice. As a practical
matter he noted Cuba's geographical location would not permit a continued
neutrality while the United States was at war. Cuba's sugar became a
scarce commodity during the war and Cuba's readiness to cooperate with the
United States made it possible for the sugar to be used to the best
advantage for the Allies. Cuba's entrance also made it virtually
impossible for German U-boats to operate in the West Indies and potential
German sabotage was avoided by the internment of a large number of German
and Austrian citizens in a camp. A draft law was enacted and 25,000 Cuban
soldiers were ready for shipment to France when the Armistice intervened.
A hospital unit of 100 Cuban doctors and nurses was equipped and sent to
the Western Front.
Panama's main reason for existence was the Canal and its very existence was
due to the United States. When the United States declared war on Germany
Panama's President Ramon Valdez severed diplomatic relations with Germany
by expelling all the German consuls in the country. He also announced that
any plots by German agents against the Canal would result in all Germans
being interned for the duration.
A month after the United States declared war Haitian President Sudre
Dartiguenave asked the Haitian Congress for a declaration of war because of
the destruction by a German submarine of a French steamer which had among
its crew and passengers Haitian citizens. Congress refused but a few days
later adopted a resolution condemning unrestricted submarine warfare and
empowering the president to break diplomatic relations with Germany if that
country refused reparations and guarantees for the future. Haiti
eventually declared war, one of the last to do so.
The Dominican Republic, then still known as Santo Domingo, had been
occupied by U.S. Marines since late 1916 and thus its government was
obliged to sever diplomatic relations with Germany when the United States
declared war. In Nicaragua, occupied since 1912, the situation was the
same - a break in relations in Apr-1917 and a declaration of war a year
later.
Honduran President Francisco Bertrand followed the United States' lead and
broke relations at the same time Nicaragua did. In July 1918 it became the
last nation in the world to declare war. This sympathy for the United
States antagonized the large number of Germans living in Honduras and in
1919 they retaliated by supporting his political enemies in overthrowing
him.
Costa Rican President Federico Tinoco had his own reasons for declaring war
on Germany. Tinoco had seized power in a coup and had been refused
recognition by President Wilson. Accordingly to gain recognition he broke
relations with Germany in Sep-1917 and followed this with a
declaration of war in the following May. With the breach of relations he
also interned all of the German residents - more to prevent their assisting
his predecessor to regain power. This record did not help him, as the
United States continued to deny recognition and even prevented Costa Rica
from taking part in the Peace Conference.
Like Tinoco, Guatemalan President Estrada Cabrera had his own reasons for
declaring war on Germany. Over the previous twenty years Germany had
gained control of the rich coffee lands and introduced scientific methods
so that they controlled about 50% of the Guatemalan economy. These
investments had meant improvements in utilities, transportation and
communications. Cabrera, a ruthless dictator of the old caudillo type,
admired Prussianism but wanted to free his country from this German
stranglehold. Cabrera had no wish to antagonize the United States because
he had seen it remove other Central American presidents who had been so
foolish or bold. The excuse was presented by the German Minister, Kurt
Lehman. Lehman had been active in plots and intrigues against the United
States in all of the Central American countries, seeking to foment a
Mexican invasion of Guatemala, and revolts and wars in the rest of the
region to divert American attention from Europe to Central America. When
these plots were discovered Cabrera broke relations with Germany and
offered Guatemalan ports and railroads for the use of the United States. A
year later the Guatemalan Assembly voted nearly unanimously that Guatemala
was an associate of the United States in the war against Germany.
El Salvador was neutral but offered the use of its ports to the United
States when the northern republic declared war. President Carlos Melendez
stressed that this was a "friendly neutrality."
The lesser South American countries had their own reasons for breaking
relations with Germany or remaining neutral.
Bolivia and Peru broke relations to curry favor with the United States in
the hope that it would support their claims to land taken by Chile in the
1879 War of the Pacific. They were disappointed but economically both
benefited. The Bolivian tin industry boomed as the British carried more
and more of the metal away for their wartime needs. Peru's copper, cotton,
rubber, oil and guano production spurted and some elements of the country
enjoyed a dizzy prosperity for two or three years. The provocations that
pushed them to take the step were due to German U-boats. In 1916 a neutral
Dutch ship carrying the Bolivian Minister to Germany and his family was
torpedoed; after a year had passed the upper classes and intellectuals were
still angry and when the United States declared war Bolivia broke
relations. The Peruvian ship Lorton was sunk in Feb-1917 off the
Spanish coast and Germany refused satisfaction. Angry that larger
Argentina had apparently been given concessions but that Peru wasn't, the
Peruvian Congress voted 105-6 to break. Nine German ships were seized but
they had been damaged by their crews. This was a pattern followed also in
Brazil, Uruguay and Cuba. Peru's contributions to the Allied cause -
besides the mineral exports - were fund raising for the Red Cross and
patrolling the west coast of South America.
In Uruguay there was a real fear of the Germans living in southern Brazil
who had long been loud in their plans to invade Uruguay and make it part of
the German Empire. The revelation of the Luxburg dispatches from Buenos
Aires showed the Germans to be stupid and cruel. When the United States
declared war President Feliciano Viera revoked Uruguayan neutrality and the
Congress gave him the power to break relations with Germany and to seize
eight German ships at Montevideo. When Brazil revoked its neutrality,
Uruguay's government announced that the principle of inter-American
solidarity would be the criterion of its foreign policy: "no American
country, which in defense of its own rights should find itself in a state
of war with nations of other continents will be treated as a belligerent."
Successive decrees repealed all neutrality proclamations as far as American
belligerents were concerned and then non-American enemies of the Central
Powers. Paraguay, a poor, landlocked country took little notice of foreign
matters and remained neutral although the small white population which
ruled the country had pro-Ally feelings and the government announced that
Paraguay would support the United States' position.
Colombia was sternly neutral because the United States had joined the
Allies. The nation still smarted from the help the United States had given
to the Panamanian revolution. Venezuelan neutrality wasn't well received
by the Allies because it was strict, insisting on the maintenance of good
relations with all belligerents. For a time the government allowed the
Germans to use their radios without hindrance at Maracaibo. Most of the
stories of pro-German sympathies eventually proved to be false, the
products of enemies of President Juan Vicente Gomez. The third Bolivarian
country, Ecuador, broke relations with Germany because of Teutonic
obtuseness and not because of any outrage at German submarines, Ecuador
being a Pacific nation without a significant merchant marine. When Peru
expelled the German Minister, Dr. Perl, he arrived in Quito and announced
that he was also German Minister to Ecuador. The Ecuadorian government had
not been notified of his appointment by Berlin so refused to receive him.
Nevertheless, he acted as if had an official capacity at state functions,
even crashing events the diplomatic corps had barred this parvenu from,
while treating Ecuadorian officialdom with undisguised contempt. His
obtuse, stupid behavior alienated Ecuadorian opinion, already inclined
toward the Allies, further away from Germany.
Thus, by Jul-1918, governments representing 61% of the land area and 52%
of the population of Latin America had associated themselves with the
Allied cause. The most influential elements among the politically
conscious had endorsed the Yanqui participation in the war and had gained a
genuine respect for Wilson's performance in Paris.
How well did the Latin American countries meet the challenge of World War
I? Despite their failure to cooperate, the seven belligerents measured up
surprisingly well by their demonstrations of solidarity. That most acted
spontaneously to support the United States proved that they recognized a
continental community of interest.
The Latin American nations that had declared war or broken relations with
Germany were invited to the Paris Peace Conference where, however, they
were little more than onlookers. Being denied a voice in arranging the
peace settlement, they threw their support behind Wilson's "grand project"
of a League of Nations. Ten Latin American states became charter members
and six others were invited to accede to the League Covenant. Eventually
all of the Latin American nations became members - at least for a time.
The United States never joined, and this abstention posed problems for the
Latin American nations and the inter-American system. What most appealed to
the Latin Americans, aside from the idealism and the prestige, was Article
X of the Covenant, guaranteeing the political and territorial integrity of
its members. This would serve, they hoped, as a counterpoint to the United
States.
Primary Sources
- New York Times Index
- Latin America in the War, Percy Martin, published by Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1925
- Survey of US-Latin American Relations, J. L. Mecham, published by Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1965
|
© 1997 Ron Genini - All rights reserved
|